Understanding Nativist Elements Relating to Immigration Policies and to the American Constitution’s Natural Born Citizen Clause (forth. circa Sept. 2021) (South Korea) by Tillman, Seth
DRAFT: Not for distribution                                                                                18 Aug 2021 v7 
DRAFT: Not for quoting 
 
32(2) STUDY ON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (forth. circa Sept. 2021) (peer 
reviewed) (South Korea) 
 
Understanding Nativist Elements  
Relating to Immigration Policies and to the American 
Constitution’s 
Natural Born Citizen Clause 
 
Seth Barrett Tillman*  
Introduction.  
 I start with a definition. A “nativist” element of a legal system is one 
which preserves some benefit for, all or some of, the nation’s citizens or its 
indigenous inhabitants, as opposed to granting that benefit neutrally to 
citizens and immigrants alike.  
Not so long ago the essential morality of such a distinction was 
considered so obvious that no defense was thought to be necessary.1 
Indeed, in many traditional societies there is no distinction between the 
indigenous inhabitants (that is, the people) and the nation. Any attempt by 
 
* Lecturer, and Associate Professor (as of 1 October 2021), Maynooth University 
Department of Law. Roinn Dlí Ollscoil Mhá Nuad. I thank Dean Eric Enlow 
(원장님), Handong International Law School, Korea, and the late George W. Carey 
& James McClellan for their words of encouragement.  
1 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439–40 (Supreme Court of the United 
States 1981) (White, J.) (“The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental 
processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary 
consequence of the community’s process of political self-definition. Self-
government, whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining the 
scope of the community of the governed and thus of the governors as well: Aliens 
are by definition those outside of this community. Judicial incursions in this area 
may interfere with those aspects of democratic self-government that are most 
essential to it.” (emphasis added)); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (Supreme 
Court of the United States 1973) (Blackmun, J.) (explaining that the power to make 
citizenship a qualification for public office “inheres in the State by virtue of its 
obligation . . . to preserve the basic conception of a political community” (quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added)); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 80–81 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: H.C. Carey & 
I. Lea, 1825) (offering no defense of the Natural Born Citizen Clause), 
<https://tinyurl.com/2bn58ukj>. 
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a government to treat newcomers equally in all respects would have been 
akin to incomprehensible.2  
Today, in the West, there is a growing view that all such distinctions  
are actual or tantamount to invidious racial or ethnic discrimination. Still 
such distinctions have long-standing bona fides—even in Western 
societies. For example, under the United States Constitution (1787), all 
elected federal positions in the national government must be held by 
citizens.3 Members of the diet’s lower chamber must be 25 years old, be an 
inhabitant of the state in which they are elected, and have held citizenship 
for at least 7 years.4 Similarly, members of the upper chamber must be 30 
years old, be an inhabitant of the state in which they are elected, and have 
held citizenship for at least 9 years.5 Like holding a congressional seat, 
eligibility to hold the presidency and vice presidency requires that the 
candidate meets an age requirement (at least 35 years old) and a residency 
requirement (at least 14 years in the United States).6 However, unlike 
 
2 See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (Supreme Court of the United States 
1979) (Powell, J.) (“The distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily 
irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government of 
a State. The Constitution itself refers to the distinction no less than 11 times . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (Supreme Court of the 
United States 1978) (Burger, C.J.) (“[I]t is clear that a State may deny aliens the right 
to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political 
institutions.” (emphasis added)). 
3 The United States Constitution imposes qualifications on federal electors—
albeit none relate to citizenship. See United States Constitution, Article 2, Section 
1, Clause 2 (the Elector Incompatibility Clause).  
4 See United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2.  
5 See ibid., Section 3, Clause 3, amended by Amendment 17. Under Article 1, 
senators were originally elected by the United States’ constituent state 
legislatures. Under Amendment 17, senators are now popularly elected. However, 
if a senate seat is vacant, a temporary senator may be chosen by a state governor 
to fill the senate vacancy. Ibid. In such circumstances, it is not clear that the 
senator must be an inhabitant of that state.  
6 See ibid., Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5, amended by Amendment 12. This clause, 
the Natural Born Citizen Clause, is also sometimes called the Presidential 
Qualifications Clause or Presidential Eligibility Clause. The prevailing view is 
that the age, inhabitancy, and citizenship requirements applicable to the 
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holding a congressional seat, eligibility to hold the presidency and vice 
presidency is limited to natives,7 or more properly, using the language of 
the United States Constitution, to “natural born citizen[s]”—a person who 
is born in the United States and a citizen since birth.8  
 
presidency also apply to the vice presidency. See ibid., Amendment 12, Clause 4 
(“[N]o person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible 
to that of Vice-President of the United States.”). See generally Bruce G. Peabody and 
Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the 
Twenty-Second Amendment (1999) 83 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 565; Bruce G. 
Peabody, The Twice and Future President Revisited: of Three-Term Presidents and 
Constitutional End Runs (2016) 101 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES 121. 
Congressional seats have an “inhabitan[cy]” requirement, but the presidency has 
a “residen[cy]” requirement. It is not entirely clear if or how these terms were 
intended to be distinguished. Compare Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 804 
(Supreme Court of the United States 1992) (O’Connor, J.) (noting that the first 
census enumeration act, Act of 1 March 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 103, used “usual place of 
abode,” “inhabitant,” “usual reside[nt]”  synonymously), with Schaefer v. 
Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1036 n.5 (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit 2000) (O’Scannlain, J.) (suggesting that “inhabitant” was a “deliberate” 
selection, and citing James Madison for the proposition that “both [terms] were 
vague, but [inhabitant] would not exclude persons absent occasionally for a 
considerable time on public or private business”).  It appears the Massachusetts 
Constitution (1780) used “inhabitant” and “residence” indistinguishably. Compare 
Massachusetts Constitution, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 2 (1780) (“The 
governor shall be chosen annually; and no person shall be eligible to this office, 
unless, at the time of his election, he shall have been an inhabitant of this 
commonwealth for seven years next preceding; and unless he shall, at the same 
time, be seized, in his own right, of a freehold, within the commonwealth, of the 
value of one thousand pounds; and unless he shall declare himself to be of the 
Christian religion.”), with ibid., Section 2, Article 1 (“There shall be annually 
elected a lieutenant-governor of the commonwealth of Massachusetts . . . who 
shall be qualified, in point of religion, property, and residence in the 
commonwealth, in the same manner with the governor . . . .”).  
7 See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (Supreme Court of the United States 1964) 
(Douglas, J.) (using “native,” “native born,” “native citizen,” and “natural born 
citizen” interchangeably).  
8 See United States Constitution, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5, amended by 
Amendment 12; see also ibid., Amendment 14 (defining citizenship by place of 
birth). Undoubtedly, there is some long-standing debate regarding the precise 
contours or boundaries of “natural born citizen” as used in the United States 
Constitution. The courts of the United States have not definitively determined the 
scope of Article 2’s language, and it is not the purpose of this Article to resolve this 
issue. See, e.g., Paul Clement and Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of Natural Born 
Citizen (2005) 128 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM 161, 161 (“[T]he relevant materials 
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This essay asks two related questions: Is a society justified in 
distinguishing citizens and immigrants? Is a society justified in 
distinguishing citizens from birth from those who become citizens 
subsequently through naturalization?  
A. Crossing an International Frontier.  
One basic difference between citizens and non-citizens relates to 
the law of return to one’s home.9 That is, the right to enter the country from 
the outside—albeit, while holding now standard identification papers, 
such as a passport.10 A citizen’s right of return to his home might be an 
absolute right, vested by the nation’s constitutional text, or an implied right 
recognized by the nation’s courts. Alternatively, the right may be 
defeasible, but the citizen’s substantive position is preserved by a 
 
clearly indicate that a ‘natural born Citizen’ means a citizen from birth with no 
need to go through naturalization proceedings.”); Mary Brigid McManamon, The 
Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood (2015) 64 CATHOLIC 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 317, 347 (concluding that any person who is born in the 
United States is a natural born citizen, excepting children of enemy soldiers and 
foreign ambassadors, and that no one born outside the United States to U.S. citizen 
parents is a natural born citizen eligible to be President “aside from children born 
to U.S. ambassadors or [U.S.] soldiers” while they are posted abroad); Jill A. Pryor, 
The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and the Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for 
Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty (1988) 97 YALE LAW JOURNAL 881, 881–
82 (“Despite its apparent simplicity, the natural-born citizen clause of the 
Constitution has never been completely understood.”).  
9 See, e.g., Book of Statutes (Israel 1950), No. 51, p. 159, as amended in 1954 and 1970, 
<https://tinyurl.com/a654f4e8>. See generally Nir Kedar, Ben-Gurion’s view of the 
place of Judaism in Israel (2013) 32(2) JOURNAL OF ISRAELI HISTORY: POLITICS, 
SOCIETY, CULTURE 157. Undoubtedly, the concept of “home” is contestable, 
particularly in a world of changing identities and borders. But see Elizabeth Hicks, 
Governing During Crises Policy Brief No. 11, A Right to Come Home? Repatriation 
Rights & Policy in Australia (Melbourne School of Government, 15 April 2021), 2 
(“In the absence of an express bill of rights, Australia largely relies on political 
mechanisms to hold the government to account, including with regard to the 
proportionality of COVID-19 related international border restrictions. Political 
mechanisms have failed to prioritise the right of citizens to return ahead of other 
political and economic concerns relevant to government business.”). 
10 See, e.g., 8 United States Code § 1185(b) (mandating passport requirement).  
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procedural right to access meaningful judicial review administered by 
independent courts.11 
As a general matter, modern constitutions do not vest non-citizens  
with any such coordinate right to cross the frontier and enter the country.12 
Indeed, keeping non-citizens out, absent permission to enter from the 
regularly constituted administrative or frontier authorities, has 
traditionally been thought to be one of the state’s most basic obligations to 
its citizens.13 Non-citizens have no absolute or constitutional right to 
enter.14 And, as a general matter, non-citizens have no clear right to judicial 
 
11 Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (Supreme Court of the United States 
2018) (Roberts, C.J.) (“[A]lthough foreign nationals seeking admission have no 
constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a circumscribed judicial 
inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a 
U.S. citizen.”); Steve Vladeck, Unpacking (Some of) the Legal Issues Surrounding 
Hoda Muthana, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/5yene456> 
(“Although the Supreme Court [of the United States] has never squarely been 
presented with such a case, it seems likely that, in an appropriate case, the Court 
would recognize that someone who is lawfully a citizen has the right to return to 
the United States.”).  
12 See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 
(Supreme Court of the United States 2020) (Alito, J.) (holding that an alien crossing 
frontier has no constitutional right to habeas corpus); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537 (Supreme Court of the United States 1950) (Minton, J.) (holding that an 
alien seeking entry into the United States has no right to any procedures other than 
those prescribed by Congress).  
13 For example, isolation, seclusion, and limiting foreign contacts were state policy 
during Japan’s Tokugawa shogunate for over 200 years. See Edict of 1635 
(Tokugawa Bakufu), <https://tinyurl.com/cjw6mz46>. Describing this period, as 
is commonly done, as one of isolation, etc is merely one possible characterization. 
Another possible, more generous, and less common characterization (except, 
perhaps, in Korea) is that Japan was at peace with its neighbours and the world.  
14 Many nations have adopted international treaties and conventions giving 
foreigners a limited entry right (sometimes supported with administrative or 
judicial review) based on asylum or refugee status, escaping war zones and 
torture, etc. These international commitments become judicially enforceable 
after they are incorporated into domestic law. See, e.g., Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 United States Code § 1158(a) (authorizing asylum to refugees 
who can establish “persecution” in home country); Convention Against Torture, 8 
United States Code of Federal Regulations § 208.16(c)(2) (granting an applicant 
relief if that person can show that it is “more likely than not that he or she would 
be tortured if” relief were denied). The European Union has a free travel right 
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review relating to their being excluded from entry. Where judicial review 
is provided, it is not a constitutional right, but a statutory right or a right 
arising in connection with the mundane judicial review which springs 
automatically from authorized administrative proceedings. 
The long-standing and consistent historical practice of Western 
countries—i.e., treating their own citizens differently from foreigners—is 
a starting point for determining the propriety of a disputed practice. 15 
Admittedly, such a historical fact is only a starting point; it does not fully 
determine our answer. Many long-established practices are now rejected 
as anti-modern, if not disgraceful. Slavery and serfdom come to mind. But 
slavery and serfdom were part of the pre-modern and pre-democratic 
West.16 The fact that modern Western democratic nations have 
consistently maintained, ratified, and recently enacted many such 
distinctions, i.e., distinguishing their own citizens and foreigners, gives this 
widespread practice democratic bona fides. That is some justification for 
the continuation of the practice of distinguishing citizens and foreigners at 
international frontiers.  
The counter-view might be that when citizens and their 
representatives govern their nations in ways which favour “their own” that 
amounts to something akin to regulatory capture.17 Here, the insiders’ (i.e., 
citizens’) excluding outsiders (i.e., non-citizens) from being physically 
present in the state by failing to consider the latter’s interests (i.e., interests 
 
across member states’ borders—but the right extends to member states’ citizens, 
and it does not expressly extend to non-citizens. See Citizens’ Rights Directive 
2004/38/EC, <https://tinyurl.com/4uj3cskr>.  
15 The Federalist No. 69, at n.* (1788) (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]t is always justifiable 
to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has been 
constitutionally questioned.”).  
16 See, e.g., United States Constitution, Amendment 13 (1865) (banning slavery). 
17 See David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture (2013) 36 HARVARD JOURNAL OF 
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 31, 31 (“Put another way, arguments about capture 
necessarily turn on a difficult counterfactual inquiry about what public-
interested regulation would look like in capture’s absence.”).   
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which the state ought to value) would be characterized as wrongful. This 
process is particularly unfair because non-citizens already lack the 
normal legal protections available to others (i.e., the state’s citizens). To put 
it another way, a government run by statesmen (or Platonic guardians, 
depending on one’s point of view) should value the interests of non-
citizens, in much the same way it is expected to value the interests of all its 
citizens (even those who cannot vote because they are underage or labour 
under some disability or incapacity). The normative force of this point of 
view might be grounded in a world-wide utilitarian framework, as opposed 
to a local just-society framework.18 Or, it might be grounded in the view that 
the accident of the place of one’s birth19 or the accident of one’s parentage20 
should not determine one’s most significant life chances. Because all such 
immutable characteristics are beyond the control of the applicant seeking 
entry across an international frontier, one might argue that granting or 
denying entry on such grounds is unjust. This Author is aware of no court of 
 
18 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Belknap Press, 1971) (arguing that a fair evaluation of the distribution of primary 
goods is to be reckoned at the level of the nation state).  
19 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, A Natural Aristocracy? (1995) 12 CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMENTARY 175, 176 (“This idolatry of mere place of birth [in the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause] seems . . . an instance of rank superstition.”); Robert Post, What is 
the Constitution’s Worst Provision? (1995) 12 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 191, 192 
(“Our constitutional order does not ordinarily distribute the prerogatives of 
citizenship on the basis of where or how one is born.”). Isn’t Professor Post’s 
position undertheorized? United States citizenship itself (even if not its 
individual prerogatives) flows from the accident of place of birth. See United 
States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1 (1868). Furthermore, naturalized 
citizens can be stripped of their U.S. citizenship for fraud in connection with 
naturalization proceedings, but U.S. citizens by birth cannot stripped of their 
citizenship in this manner. Moreover, some “prerogatives of citizenship” do flow 
from one’s place of birth. An in-state college tuition benefit is one such example.  
20 During the American Civil War, both sides facilitated foreigners’ participating 
in their armies, even as senior officers. On the Union side, entire organized 
regiments—officers and soldiers—were composed of foreigners—e.g., Irish, 
German, etc. See WILLIAM L. BURTON, MELTING POT SOLDIERS: THE UNION’S ETHNIC 
REGIMENTS (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1988), 
<https://tinyurl.com/m3j52e6v>.  
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record which has sought to justify an applicant’s entry across an 
international frontier on such grounds.  
The question of whose welfare a nation’s government ought to value, 
prize, or maximize is not entirely dissimilar to the commensurate question 
in company law. The members of a board of directors of a corporation are 
elected by its stockholders,21 and they are responsible to its stockholders.22 
As a general matter, the board is charged with maximizing the 
stockholders’ returns.23 But is that the board’s entire duty? What third-
party interests (if any) should the board consider when making 
decisions?24 Of course, in maximizing the stockholders’ returns , a board 
will frequently consider third-party interests which it believes are aligned 
with its stockholders’ interests. For example, a board might believe (and 
rightly so) that granting a benefit, even at some significant cost, to its 
workers, or to inhabitants where its manufacturing facilities are located, 
or, perhaps, establishing a reputation for protecting the environment will, 
ultimately, resound to the stockholders’ long-term financial interests. The 
more difficult question is: When the board (if ever) should make a concrete 
 
21 See 8 Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(b) (providing for the election of 
directors by stockholders). 
22 See ibid., § 141(k) (providing for the removal of directors by stockholders). 
23 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Supreme Court of Delaware 1986) (Moore, J.) (explaining that wh en the board is 
auctioning the corporate entity, “[s]elective dealing to fend off a hostile but 
determined bidder was no longer a proper objective. Instead, obtaining the 
highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should have been the central 
theme guiding director action.”); ibid. (“A board may have regard for various 
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally 
related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”). This understanding is hardly 
unique to directors and company law, but extends more broadly to other 
fiduciaries, such as trustees. See, e.g., Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch. 270, 287 (High 
Court of England, Chancery Division) (Megarry, Vice Chancellor) (“When the 
purpose of the trust is to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, as is 
usually the case, the best interests of the beneficiaries are normally their best 
financial interests.”).  
24 See generally Rivka Weill, Declassifying the Classified (2006) 31 DELAWARE 
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 891, 924–29 (describing wealth maximizing norms).  
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sacrifice (not otherwise required by established law) reducing stockholders’ 
returns in order to benefit third-parties?  
To put it another way, an argument based on regulatory capture or 
public choice theory posits that the moral relationship between insiders 
and outsiders is one based on substantive equality, but that the machinery 
of democratic representation fails to reflect that equality.25 Hence, the 
capture by the “insiders” (i.e., citizens through the representatives who 
they elect) against the “outsiders” (i.e., immigrant non-citizens lacking 
voting rights). But if that perspective is fundamentally flawed, if insiders 
and outsiders are substantively different, then a government’s treating 
citizens and non-citizens alike amounts to regulatory capture by the 
“outsiders” against the “insiders.”26 Furthermore, where it is permissible 
for elected representatives to serve interests other than their citizen-
constituents, standards for democratic oversight through voting become 
muddied, if not deeply problematic. In circumstances where monitoring 
and supervision become pragmatically difficult, then representatives 
have greater opportunities to engage in self-dealing, including entrenching 
themselves in office.27  
 
25 See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (Supreme Court of the United States 1978) 
(Burger, C.J.) (“[T]he Court has treated certain restrictions on aliens with 
heightened judicial solicitude, a treatment deemed necessary since aliens—
pending their eligibility for citizenship—have no direct voice in the political 
processes.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).  
26 See ibid., at 295 (“A new citizen has become a member of a Nation, part of a people 
distinct from others. The individual, at that point, belongs to the polity and is 
entitled to participate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking. 
Accordingly, we have recognized a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from 
participation in its democratic political institutions . . . .” (citation and quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added)).  
27 See Weill, supra note 24, at 926 (“[A]ny other rule that would require directors to 
maximize other constituencies’ wealth would leave directors practically with no 
supervision. A servant told to serve multiple masters is a servant free of 
supervision, since he or she may always invoke the conflicting interests against 
each other. In other words, any rule other than one requiring directors to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth is infeasible [as a practical programme for 
judicial oversight over corporate governance].” (footnote omitted)).  
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The language of regulatory capture only opens the discussion, but it 
does not answer what is essentially a moral or normative question:28 Ought 
governments treat citizens and non-citizens the same? And if they should be 
treated differently, on what occasions, and to what degree?   
Undoubtedly, the normative force of the position that a state, in some 
circumstances, may (and, sometimes, should) treat its citizens and non-
citizens differently should not obscure the normative force of the counter-
position: in many situations, it is perfectly sound (good, right, just, etc) to 
treat citizens and non-citizens entirely the same. For example, the Framers 
of the United States Constitution (1787) could have co-opted state courts to 
rule on all legal issues arising in connection with the new national 
government. Instead, the United States Constitution provided for separate 
federal courts, and it also authorized those courts’ having “diversity” 
jurisdiction over disputes between United States citizens and aliens. It was 
feared that state courts would be engines of unfairness, which by favouring 
local litigants (i.e., United States citizens) would lead to reduced 
investment from and trade with foreigners. More importantly, it was also 
feared that leaving foreigners’ commercial interests in the hands of state 
courts would risk war with foreign nations, because the latter would seek 
to vindicate the just interests of their citizens’ commercial interests in the 
United States.29  
The same moral and policy issue is at the root of any transnational or 
international utilitarian perspective—any such perspective posits that 
governments do not exist to serve their particular people.30 On this view, 
 
28 See Engstrom, supra note 17.  
29 See United States Constitution, Article 3, Section 2; Federalist No. 80 (1788) 
(Alexander Hamilton); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction?: Historical 
Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes 
Involving Noncitizens (1996) 21 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6. 
30 Compare JEAN RASPAIL, LE CAMP DES SAINTS (Paris, France: Robert Laffont, 1973) 
(fiction), with Enoch Powell MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, Address 
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governments should maximize the interests of all people: citizens and non-
citizens alike. One wonders if the proponents of this latter view really 
would see this framework implemented worldwide. It is one thing to 
suggest that a relatively wealthy Western nation should set aside the 
interests of some of its people, some of the time, on behalf of relatively 
poorly placed or victimized third-world outsiders. That said, if this 
international utilitarian perspective were truly implemented across the 
board, then third-world countries should set aside their peoples’ interests 
(at times) in order to benefit inhabitants of the first-world. Would anyone 
care to argue that the parliament of Bangladesh, in deciding to enact 
legislation, should, all other things being equal, actively weigh the interests 
of the working poor in Europe and North America against the interests of 
its own most opulent elite? Does anyone actually believe this?  
B. Explaining the Nativist Elements of the United States Constitution’s 
“Natural Born Citizen” Requirement?  
The Federal Convention which drafted the United States Constitution 
was scheduled to meet on 14 May 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. But it 
was unable to muster a quorum until 25 May 1787. The convention met in 
secret sessions. It would conclude its meetings on 17 September 1787, when 
its work product, the proposed constitution, would be sent to the Articles 
Congress which then forwarded it to the thirteen states for ratification. 
Ratification would take place over the course of 1787 through 1788. The new 
Constitution and government would be put into effect in 1788 and 1789, 
when the first federal elections were held, Congress convened, counted the 
votes of the electors for President and Vice President, and gave official 
notice to George Washington and John Adams that they had been elected 
President and Vice President, respectively.  
Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5, the Natural Born Citizen Clause, states:  
 
to the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre (Birmingham, England: 
Midland Hotel, 20 April 1968) (non-fiction).  
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No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible 
to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that 
Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and 
been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. 
Although many records from the Federal Convention and the ratification 
period are extant, there are few records explaining the origins, meaning, 
and purpose of the Natural Born Citizen Clause. As one commentator has 
explained: “The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
furnish no clues to the underlying purpose.”31 As to the origin of the clause 
and its intellectual progenitors (to the extent it had any), little is known. In 
particular, extant records provide little guidance why the Constitution 
(1787) distinguishes “natural born citizens,” i.e., citizens from birth, from 
immigrants who subsequently become naturalized citizens.  
1. Pre-Federal Convention American Legal Sources.32 The Articles of 
Confederation (1781), which was the governing constitution of the United 
States prior to the Constitution of 1787,33 had no executive presidency. It did 
have a presiding officer—a president of the Articles Congress—who was 
chosen from among the delegates.34 Under the Articles, neither the 
president, nor the delegates from the thirteen states had any qualifications 
 
31 Charles Gordon, Who can be President of the United States  (1968) 28 MARYLAND 
LAW REVIEW 1, 3; Post, supra note 19, at 192 (noting that the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause is “remarkably innocent of both legislative history and judicial gloss”). 
Compare Gordon, supra passim (discussing constitutional limitations), with Seth 
Barrett Tillman, Who Can Be President of the United States?: Candidate Hillary 
Clinton and the Problem of Statutory Qualifications  (2016) 5 BRITISH JOURNAL OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL STUDIES 95 (discussing statutory limitations).  
32 Some, albeit not all, commentators have suggested that the Constitution’s 
“natural born citizen” language has the same meaning as “natural born subject” in 
pre-1787 British statutes. This interpretive issue has never been conclusively 
settled by the federal courts.  
33 See generally Articles of Confederation (1781); Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural 
Address (4 March 1861) (“The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was 
formed in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774.”), 
<https://tinyurl.com/znt4m3x7>.  
34 Articles of Confederation (1781), Article IX, Section 5.  
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relating to citizenship, inhabitancy, or residency.35 In short, the Articles 
did not furnish a model for the Natural Born Citizen Clause.  
Some have suggested that the model for the executive presidency in 
the United States Constitution (1787) was the New York Constitution (1777) 
or the Massachusetts Constitution (1780).36 The executive governor of New 
York under its 1777 constitution had no qualifications relating to 
citizenship, inhabitancy, or residency.37 The executive governor of 
Massachusetts under its 1780 constitution had qualifications relating to 
inhabitancy, property, and religion, but no qualifications relating to 
citizenship or age (which are found in the Natural Born Citizen Clause).38 It 
would appear that neither the Articles of Confederation (1781) nor pre-
ratification (i.e., pre-1787) state constitutions furnished working models 
for the Constitution of 1787’s Natural Born Citizen Clause.  
2. The Federal Convention: 1787. The first report of the clause’s 
“natural born citizen” language emerges from the 4 September 1787 report 
 
35 See ibid., Article V, Clause 2 (“No State shall be represented in Congress by less 
than two, nor more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being 
a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, 
being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for 
which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument of any 
kind.”).  
36 See, e.g., Federalist No. 69 (1788) (Alexander Hamilton) (“The qualified negative of 
the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; 
and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this 
State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power of the 
President would exceed that of the governor of New York, because the former 
would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it 
would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose 
constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the 
convention have copied.”  (emphases added)). See generally Gregory E. Maggs, A 
Guide and Index for Finding Evidence of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution 
in Early State Constitutions and Declarations of Rights  (2020) 98 NORTH CAROLINA 
LAW REVIEW 779. Judge Maggs now sits on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces.  
37 See New York Constitution (1777); Gordon, supra note 31, at 3 n.8.  
38 See supra note 6 (collecting authority from the Massachusetts Constitution 
(1780)).  
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of the Federal Convention’s Committee of Eleven.39 This was less than two 
weeks before the Convention concluded its business. The Committee of 
Eleven’s proposed Natural Born Citizen Clause was reported without 
explanation as to why or on what authority it had added the phrase “natural 
born citizen,” and on 7 September 1787, its proposed language was 
approved by the Convention without reported debate.40 The Committee of 
Style was impanelled on 8 September 1787; it reported on 12 September 
1787. It made only minor modifications to the clause’s text,41 and its 
proposed language was adopted by the Convention on 15 September 1787, 
without any vote.42 This became the clause’s final text.  
 Not only was there no recorded discussion from the Federal 
Convention relating to the clause’s “natural born citizen” language, there 
was little discussion of qualifications generally. Apparently, the first such 
discussion of citizenship-related qualifications was in the Hamilton Plan, 
which he put forward on 18 June 1787. Hamilton’s Article IX, Section 1 
states: “No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United 
States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a 
 
39 The Committee of Eleven received its instructions from the Convention on 31 
August 1787. It reported to the Convention on 4 September 1787. See 5 DEBATES ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 506, 507 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., 
Washington, District of Columbia: n.p., 2d ed. 1845) (reproducing 4 September 
1787 report, with modifications to Article IX, Section 2—using “natural-born 
citizen”).  
40 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 532 and 536 (Max 
Farrand, ed., New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1911) (7 September 
1787 entry in the Convention’s Journal and in Madison’s notes, recording 
approval of the Committee of Eleven’s proposed Natural Born Citizen’s clause 
absent debate and absent a recorded vote showing division of the state 
delegations).  
41 See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 298, 302 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., Washington, District of 
Columbia: n.p., 2d ed. 1836) (reporting Committee of Style’s draft and Natural Born 
Citizen Clause).  
42 See ibid., at 311, 314 (reproducing the Convention’s Journal for 15 September 
1787).  
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Citizen of the United States.”43 Although copies of his plan may have been 
circulated to the members, Hamilton’s plan was not properly before the 
Convention: it was never formally voted on or adopted.44 It did not use 
anything like the phrase “natural born citizen.” 
 The second such discussion is found in a 25 July 1787 letter from John 
Jay, writing from New York, to George Washington, in Philadelphia. At that 
time, Washington was President of the Convention. And, Jay was the 
United States Secretary of Foreign Affairs—a functionary of the Articles 
Congress. He was not a member of the Federal Convention, and there is no 
good reason to believe that he had any access to the Convention’s ongoing 
secret deliberations and proposals. At this juncture, Jay was likely 
unaware that the Convention was to craft a single-person executive 
presidency. Jay wrote:  
Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide 
a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the Administration 
of our national Government, and to declare expressly that the 
Command[er] in Chief of the [A]merican army shall not be given to, nor 
devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen.45  
More than a few have suggested that this letter was the source of the 
Constitution’s “natural born citizen” language. More specifically, it has 
been suggested that this letter (or its contents) was informally circulated by 
Washington to other members of the Convention. But there is no actual 
evidence of Washington’s having done so. Likewise, there is no record 
establishing that Jay’s letter was the source of the Constitution’s “natural 
 
43 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 617, 629 (Max Farrand ed., New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1911). 
44 See ibid., at 617 (with Farrand noting that “this plan was not formally before the 
Convention”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 300 (Max 
Farrand, ed., New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1911) (reporting 
Robert Yates’ notes from 18 June 1787, which stated that “Mr. H. produced his 
plan”). Yates, like Alexander Hamilton, was a New York delegate to the Federal 
Convention.  
45 Letter from John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to George Washington, 
President of the Constitutional Convention (25 July 1787), FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
<https://tinyurl.com/35mukpcs>.  
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born citizen” language. More importantly, Jay’s advice was not followed in 
any meaningful fashion. 
Jay, as foreign minister, was likely familiar with then extant British 
practice. In 1787, when Jay wrote his letter to Washington, the British 
monarch and his family could be foreigners, but the English Parliament 
had imposed statutory qualifications, under the Act of Settlement (1701), on 
appointed officers. Under the text of the 1701 English statute, one could not 
hold an appointed position unless one had been born in the king’s 
dominions46—even if one were subsequently naturalized.47 To the extent 
that Jay was addressing appointed “officers of or under the United States” 
as part of “the administration of [the] national Government,” his advice 
was not followed. Under the Constitution of 1787, there are no 
constitutionally mandated qualifications, much less citizenship-related 
qualifications, for appointed positions in the federal government. In short, 
American practice, as mandated by the United States Constitution (1787), 
was the opposite of British practice, as mandated by British statutory 
requirements, at that time. The former had no formal qualifications 
relating to appointed federal positions; the latter required the appointee to 
be a subject of the king when born. This is some substantial indication that 
Jay’s letter, even assuming it had been circulated to the members, was not 
followed in regard to the largest number of positions in what would become 
the United States government’s administrative apparatus.  
 
46 See HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 16 (London, 
England: Routledge Cavendish, 7th ed. 2009) (explaining that the Channel Islands 
and Isle of Man are not part of the United Kingdom, but “they are part of Her 
Majesty’s dominions”). See generally Sodor and Man (Bishop) v Derby (Earl) (1751) 
2 Vesey Senior Reports 337. 
47 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 164–65 (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005) (describing the legal effect of the Act of 
Settlement). See generally Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 and 13 Will. 3, ch. 2, § 3, 
<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Will3/12-13/2>.  
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In contrast to appointed federal officers, all elected federal officials 
do have constitutionally mandated citizenship qualifications . So in this 
sense, even if not in consequence of Jay’s letter, one might argue that Jay’s 
general approach was adopted by the Convention. However, this assumes 
that Congress was understood as part of the “administration of [the] 
national Government.” But that assumption may be wrong—the language of 
“administration” was frequently reserved for Executive Branch positions. 
Congress’ role is better characterized as legislative (as in law-making), as 
opposed to administrative (as in law enforcement).48 Furthermore, 
although United States citizenship is a mandated qualification for elected 
federal positions, the Constitution does not positively exclude dual 
nationals from such posts. So persons connected to foreign nations and 
holding foreign citizenship are not excluded from holding elected 
positions in the United States government.49 Again, this is some indication 
that Jay’s position (which sought to exclude foreigners from service in the 
federal government) was not adhered to and that his letter did not supply 
any model for what became the Natural Born Citizen Clause.  
Jay’s position was not adopted with regard to the presidency and the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces—at least, not in toto. The 
President of the United States is the commander-in-chief of United States 
armed forces. And in the normal course of events, presidents are elected, 
and subject to the Constitution’s Natural Born Citizen Clause 
 
48 See Letter from John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to George Washington, 
President of the Constitutional Convention (25 July 1787), supra note 45, at n.3. Jay 
struck out the following language in his letter: “that none but natural born citizens 
shall be admitted into our Legislatures or our national civil Gov[ernment]t shall 
be administered only by natural born citizens”. Ibid. Arguably, Jay distinguished 
the legislature from the administration of the “national civil government.” Ibid.  
49 Australia’s constitution bans its own citizens from holding seats in the national 
parliament if they also hold foreign citizenship. See Australia Constitution (1900), 
Chapter 1, Part IV, Section 44; Sykes v Cleary [1992] 176 Commonwealth Law 
Reports 77 (High Court of Australia) (adjudicating a Section 44 dispute). The 
modern Australian position is much closer to the policy John Jay put forward 
than what was adopted by the Federal Convention.  
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qualifications. But not all “presidents” are elected. “Acting presidents” are 
not elected; they succeed to the presidency under the authority of the 
Constitution’s Presidential Succession Clause50 and the Presidential 
Succession Act of 1947.51 The prevailing view is that, as a constitutional 
matter, acting presidents are not subject to the constitutionally-imposed 
qualifications applicable to elected presidents.52 It follows that contrary to 
what Jay proposed in his 1787 letter, an acting president/commander-in-
chief of the armed forces need not be a natural born citizen.53 Again, this is 
some indication that Jay’s position was not adhered to and that his letter 
did not supply any model for what became the Natural Born Citizen Clause. 
Nor is this a picayune critique about a subject absent real world 
consequences.54 Jay, in his letter, sought to restrict the position of 
commander-in-chief exclusively to natural born citizens. Furthermore, 
not only did Jay’s letter address regularly appointed commanders-in-
chief, it also expressly addressed temporary commanders-in-chief: i.e., 
anyone who the powers of commander-in-chief might “devolve on.” Jay 
sought to limit such temporary commanders to natural born citizens. The 
Federal Convention did not enact Jay’s suggested policy.  
 
50 See United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2.  
51 See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 United States Code § 19.  
52 See Mark Tushnet, Resolving the Paradox of Democratic Constitutionalism? (2000) 
3 GREEN BAG 2D 225, 226 n.1 (reviewing FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND 
DEMOCRACY (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999)). Congress, 
acting by statute, has chosen to impose the Constitution’s qualifications 
applicable to elected president on acting presidents who succeed by operation of 
the Presidential Succession Act of 1947. See 3 United States Code § 19(e) (“[T]his 
section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President 
under the Constitution.”); see also infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
53 See James C. Ho, Unnatural Born Citizens and Acting Presidents  (2000) 17 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 575, 582–83 (“That individual serves not as 
‘President,’ but as ‘Acting President’—a position for which the Constitution 
imposes no citizenship related eligibility requirements whatsoever . . . .”). Judge 
Ho now sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  
54 For example, John Shalikashvili, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
of the U.S. military, is a naturalized United States citizen. See John Malchase David 
Shalikashvili, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, <https://tinyurl.com/2vcmf9nk>.  
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Finally, on 26 July 1787, George Mason proposed adding property 
and citizenship qualifications for persons serving in each of the three 
branches of the federal government.55 Nothing ever became of Mason’s 
proposed property qualifications, and Mason’s proposal (like Hamilton’s 
Plan) only spoke to citizenship as a qualification, absent any mention of a 
“natural born citizen” limitation.  
As one commentator concluded: “no explanation of the origin or 
purpose of the [Natural Born Citizen Clause] appears anywhere in the 
recorded deliberations of the Convention.”56  
3. The Ratification Period. The ratification period produced little 
discussion of qualifications for federal officeholders and the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause. Frequently, state conventions and discussions in the press 
glossed over the clause, with little or no substantive discussion. For 
example, at the Rhode Island state convention, which met in 1790, the 
entirety of the discussion was “Second Article/1st Section/read—no 
objections.”57 One anonymous commentator, American Citizen, wrote: “Our 
President must be matured by the experience of years, and being born among 
us, his character at thirty-five must be fully understood.”58 American 
Citizen’s position is somewhat undertheorized. “Being born” among a 
population will only produce some weak tendency, at best, towards 
establishing a public reputation for character. After all, a person born 
amongst the population can be sent abroad or live in isolation within. Still, 
 
55 See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 41, at 219, 219–20.  
56 Gordon, supra note 31, at 4; see also Post, supra note 19, at 192 (noting that the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause is “remarkably innocent of both legislative history 
and judicial gloss”).  
57 THEODORE FOSTER, MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION HELD AT SOUTH KINGSTON, RHODE 
ISLAND, IN MARCH, 1790, at 56 (Providence, Rhode Island: n.p., 1929). Foster’s 
Minutes are state ratification materials. Albeit Rhode Island held these debates 
both after the United States Constitution was ratified in 1787, and after the 
Constitution put into effect in 1788 (when the first federal elections were held) and 
in 1789 (when the first Congress met). 
58 American Citizen I, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (26 September 1787). American 
Citizen’s authorship is frequently ascribed to Tench Coxe.  
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it is at least arguable that an immigrant coming to the United States at a very 
young age, and then naturalized, would be similarly placed to the native in 
this respect.  
Federal Farmer and Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius in 
Federalist No. 68, had an underdeveloped exchange on the issue. Federal 
Farmer wrote: “The election of this officer [the Vice President], as well as of 
the president of the United States seems to be properly secured . . . .”59 Citing 
Federal Farmer, Hamilton wrote:  
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States 
is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has 
escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest 
mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, 
who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election 
of the President is pretty well guarded.60  
Hamilton continued:  
Nothing was more to be desired, than that every practicable obstacle 
should be opposed to cabal, intrigue and corruption. These most 
deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have 
been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, 
but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper 
ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by 
raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the union?61 
At first blush, one might think that Hamilton’s abstract language was also 
about the Natural Born Citizen Clause and that the clause’s purpose was to 
 
59 The Federal Farmer: Letter III (10 October 1787), reprinted in OBSERVATIONS 
LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSED BY THE 
LATE CONVENTION; AND TO SEVERAL ESSENTIAL AND NECESSARY ALTERATIONS IN IT, IN A 
NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 15, 18 (n.p.: 
Thomas Greenleaf, 1787), <https://tinyurl.com/5htwkfh2>, 
<https://tinyurl.com/4ezjnnht>. Federal Farmer expressed similar sentiments 
again in early 1788. Federal Farmer: Letter XIV (17 January 1788), FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, <https://tinyurl.com/r45ekwb8> (“Viewing the principles and 
checks established in the election of the president, and especially considering the 
several states may guard the appointment of the electors as they shall judge best, I 
confess there appears to be a judicious combination of principles and 
precautions.”). Some ascribe Federal Farmer’s authorship to Richard Henry Lee.  
60 Federalist No. 68 (12 March 1788) (Alexander Hamilton).  
61 Ibid.  
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obstruct foreign powers’ interfering in the nation’s “councils.” But 
Hamilton’s passage continues with: 
But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the 
most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the 
appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of 
men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; 
but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the 
people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the 
temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have 
excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation 
might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No 
senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or 
profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. 
Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents 
in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister 
bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already 
taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to 
the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace 
so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor 
would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they 
would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon 
motives, which though they could not properly be denominated 
corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.62 
In other words, Hamilton’s focus in Federalist No. 68 was not on 
qualifications, but on the election of the President via electors spread 
across the nation, thereby rendering foreign interference difficult. 
Certainly, the passage teaches that foreign interference was a concern at 
the time, but it does not establish that it was a, much less the, primary 
concern behind the Natural Born Citizen Clause. This passage from 
Federalist No. 68 would have been a peculiarly appropriate place to discuss 
the Natural Born Citizen Clause if its purpose, in fact, related to foreign 
interference.  
Just as the Natural Born Citizen Clause generated little meaningful 
discussion at the Federal Convention, it generated little meaningful 
discussion during ratification. It may be worth asking why this is so. 
 
62 Ibid.  
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4. Post-Ratification Materials on the Natural Born Citizen Clause . 
Before turning to post-ratification materials, here it will be helpful to shift 
the conversation towards explaining a moral dilemma.  
(A.) A Moral Dilemma. Imagine two industrialized nations, A 
and B, at war—not just war, but total war, akin to the world wars, producing 
harms against one another and against third parties. Both nations A and B 
have relatively recent histories of oppressing domestic ethnic and racial 
minorities and denying full equality based on ethnicity, race, sex, religion, 
etc. But by the time hostilities began, Nation A has largely overcome that 
history, and it has enshrined substantive equality principles into its legal 
system. The good offices of a third-party neutral nation, acting as an 
intermediary, have established that both sides now desire face-to-face 
negotiations towards an armistice, and then a peace treaty. There is a hitch. 
Nation B will not meet with Nation A if A’s delegation includes officials  
from a particular minority group. You can imagine who those persons 
would be: just think of Nazis vis-à-vis Jews, and other groups the former 
viewed as less than human.  
Now one response by Nation A to such a precondition is simply 
procedural. Each side chooses its own delegates, absent preconditions and 
redlines from the other side. That said, negotiated positions, even prior to 
the start of formal negotiations, are not entirely unknown. Near the end of 
World War II, the United States shifted its (and, in effect, the Allied 
Powers’) position from Japan’s unconditional surrender to the 
unconditional surrender of Japan’s armed forces.63 There is some historical 
evidence that this was an effort by the United States, in response to 
communications from the Japanese authorities, to offer the latter some 
limited assurances in regard to the role of the emperor in a continuing 
 
63 See Michael D. Pearlman, Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the 
Atomic Bomb 7 (Combat Studies Institute 1996), 
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA473544.pdf>.  
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imperial Japanese political system.64 Without these assurances surrender 
negotiations would have been further delayed.  
Procedural propriety aside, there are pragmatic and normative 
reasons for Nation A to accept and to reject Nation B’s precondition. The 
reasons to reject Nation B’s precondition are obvious. First, Nation A’s 
failing to reject the precondition is a break with its own practice and, 
perhaps, with its own historical good faith settlement of its own difficult 
past in regard to its minorities. Second, agreeing to this redline might reify 
such compromises at home and abroad, including, for example, possible 
future dealings with Nation B. Nation A’s taking a principled stand is an 
opportunity to make Nation B reflect on its own practices. Third, Nation A 
might lose the benefits that flow from using its own “best” or most 
“qualified” citizens in negotiating a peace settlement.  
Are there reasons for Nation A to accept Nation B’s proposal? As a 
pragmatic matter, if Nation B is losing the war, Nation B may be willing to 
set aside its own redlines. On the other hand, sometimes an unjust society 
might have a just casus belli, and sometimes an unjust society, even one 
absent a just casus belli, might fight its opponents to a standstill or even 
emerge victorious. Happy endings are not the result of every war. This 
hypothetical is not premised on the good guys’ prevailing.  
What reasons (if any) are there for Nation A to accept Nation B’s 
precondition? One reason is obvious: to end the war. And to end the war, 
negotiations must start. Any delay in starting negotiations is likely to 
extend the war, with all its concomitant downsides. For example, Nation 
A’s refusal may be likely to furnish Nation B with propaganda points at 
home and abroad. Second, as long as Nation B’s bombs rain down on Nation 
A’s territory, people, and armed forces, even those among the 
discriminated against group in Nation A might be willing to concede this 
 
64 See MICHAEL SCHALLER, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 10, 17–18 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985).  
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enemy-imposed wrongful condition to end the prospect of their being 
bombed and, also, to protect all their fellow citizens, in the discriminated 
against group or not, including those in the theatre of active war, from the 
prospect of an extended war.  
But there is more. Nation B has prisoner of war camps (or worse). 
Among the prisoners from Nation A are citizens from all its groups—
including the discriminated against group. How do Nation B’s military 
authorities running those camps treat members of the discriminated 
against group? The more unjust and criminal Nation B is in administering 
those camps, the greater the obligation on Nation A’s authorities to recover 
its own people in a timely way—while the prisoners remain alive.65 Would 
Jewish citizens of the World War II Allies have pressed their home 
governments for equal participation among the roles for negotiating an end 
to hostilities in Europe if their absence put the Allies in control of the death 
camps more quickly? Finally, some have even argued that a nation’s 
statesmen, here Nation A’s leadership, in fighting a war against a non-ideal 
 
65 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES/THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED 100–
102 & n.26 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999). Rawls 
argued that the “the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the fire-bombing of 
Japanese cities were great wrongs.” Ibid. He supported that position by noting 
that United States’ armed forces had already defeated the Japanese military at 
Midway, in the Philippine Sea, Leyte, and in many Pacific islands. Interestingly, 
Rawls made no mention of the contribution of Australian, British, Chinese, Indian, 
and other Allied forces in those battles or, more generally, in the Asian-Pacific 
theatre of war. Nor did he discuss the countries and other territories which 
remained under military occupation until the time of the Japanese surrender. See 
also WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880–1964, at 
436 (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1978) (noting that in 1945, Japan’s 
generals “told each other [that] most of their conquests, including the Chinese 
heartland, were firmly in their hands.” (emphasis added)). Finally, the millions of 
civilian internees and prisoners of war then under Japanese control did not enter 
Rawls’s analysis.  
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society,66 such as Nation B, have a substantial obligation to consider the 
harms that a continuing war would inflict on the enemy.67  
Nation A’s authorities, charged with making the decision to accept or 
to reject Nation B’s precondition, will have to act in real time and with less 
than perfect information, particularly in regard to the consequences 
which will flow from the different decisions which they may decide to take. 
There is no easy answer to this question. Persons acting in good faith could 
arrive at divergent answers.  
The larger point is that there is a substantial moral difficulty here. In 
assessing that difficulty, one is squarely confronted with the elastic quality 
of “merit” and “qualifications” in relation to holding government posts 
where there may be no widespread agreement what constitutes success.68 
“Qualifications” include not only the would-be officeholder’s manifesto or 
programme for future reform and negotiations, and the candidate’s 
education and experience, but also include how “others,” including one’s 
opponents, react to the officeholder, and that may be true even where that 
reaction is based on prejudice and bigotry.69 To put it another way, the 
 
66 Ibid., at 89–113 (developing moral discourse around conflicts between ideal and 
non-ideal societies); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1993) 20(1) CRITICAL INQUIRY 
36.  
67 See generally ibid.  
68 See, e.g., John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The 
Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity (1999) 104 DICKINSON LAW REView 1, 94 
(“It is entirely conceivable that the best person for the position of President might 
be some highly prominent public servant whose parents brought her here from 
another country as immigrants.” (emphasis added)). What does the author mean 
by “best”?  
69 The Supreme Court of the United States permits the government to use 
citizenship status as a factor in employment decisions for some public 
employment. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (Supreme Court of the 
United States 1979) (Powell, J.) (permitting state to exclude aliens from permanent 
certification as public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (Supreme 
Court of the United States 1978) (Burger, C.J.) (permitting state to exclude aliens 
from state police). It is noteworthy that the argument for affirmative action based 
on race or ethnicity is that qualifications are not entirely about education, 
experience, and civil service examination scores. Rather, the argument is that the 
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difficulty is recognizing that there is an “other” whose existence, 
preferences, and demands we ought to consider, even in situations where 
the other’s demands are unfair, and even in situations where one decides 
not to make concessions to the “other.” 
(B.) Modern Post-Ratification Materials. In a Congressional 
Research Service report, Jack Maskell wrote:  
The apparent purposes of this citizenship clause were thus to assure 
the requisite fealty and allegiance to the nation from the person to be 
the chief executive of the United States, and to prevent wealthy foreign 
citizens, and particularly wealthy foreign royalty and their relatives, 
from coming to the United States, becoming naturalized citizens, and 
then scheming and buying their way into the Presidency or creating an 
American monarchy.70  
Similarly, Professor Akhil Reed Amar wrote that the clause was 
motivated by fear that “a foreign earl or duke might cross the Atlantic with 
immense wealth and a vast retinue, and then use his European riches to buy 
friends on a scale that no homegrown citizen could match” which might 
“pervert American democracy.”71  
 Notice how there is no “other” in this discussion.  
The danger of a European nobleman’s establishing a monarchy in the 
United States is not that the American polity, in effect, would be conquered 
with a concomitant loss of hard-won independence, or that the United 
States would be merged into an extant European state—such as the United 
Kingdom or France. If a monarchy were launched in the United States, it is 
 
system benefits when the police officer and the community s/he patrols are in the 
same group. Likewise, there may be systemic benefits where a teacher and student 
are in the same group. Undoubtedly, this is a contestable empirical claim. Greater 
or lesser effectiveness with regard to hiring decisions may be connected to the 
target group’s experience with prejudice at the hands of other population groups 
or arising in connection with its own bigotry vis-à-vis outsiders. If, when, and how 
wider society should adapt to such a situation, with the concomitant risk of 
rewarding and reifying it, is a substantial element of the question at hand. 
70 Jack Maskell, Congressional Research Service, R42097, Qualifications for the 
President and the “Natural Born” Citizenship Eligibility Requirement 8 (2016), 
<https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42097.html>. 
71 AMAR, supra note 47, at 164–65.  
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not described as an extension of a foreign monarchy, but is instead 
described as something akin to an American one. Undesirable—yes, but 
essentially foreign?—no. According to these commentators, the motivating 
fear (i.e., the underlying policy concern) for the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause is that the candidate might lack the “requisite fealty and 
allegiance”—as if those connections were merely insufficiently developed 
or had not quite matured. The motivating fear expressed by these 
commentators is not that the candidate is totally disconnected from the 
United States, its land, its people, its linguistic heritage and literature, 
culture, and civilization,72 or, that the presidential candidate’s loyalties lie 
entirely with some foreign polity or ruling family. Such possibilities are not 
plainly stated—they are, at most, hinted at. But such concerns are not 
directly voiced. If such concerns were brought to the readers’ attention, 
they might undermine the rationales for the relatively generous 
constitutional provisions admitting foreign-born U.S. citizens to all other 
elected and appointed national positions in the government.  
Professor Amar expresses some concern that normal political 
competition for otherwise competitive posts would be prevented or, 
better, crowded out by great wealth having European aristocratic sources. 
The concern here is expressed as essentially an intramural or 
distributional failure relating to political competition, and even where the 
corruption concern is characterized as a “perver[sion] [of] American 
democracy,” it does not characterize the injury  as a foreign power 
conquering the United States. The potential for failure by admitting the 
foreign born is not described in crisis-like or existential terms; rather, it is 
described in the policy-wonk’s precautionary language associated with 
humdrum institutional design in connection with American aspirational 
good governance norms.  
 
72 See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 176 (referring to “country, polity, [and] a way of 
life”).  
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Turning to commentators who object to the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause, consider Professor Randall Kennedy (Harvard Law School) and 
Professor Robert Post (Yale Law School). Professor Kennedy wrote: 
One concrete way of measuring the extent to which people affiliated 
with different social groups are full and equal members of this nation 
is to ask whether a person associated with that group could plausibly 
be elevated to the highest office in the land. . . .  
Formally barred from the Presidency . . . are people who may have 
invested their all, even risked their lives, on behalf of the nation. . . . This 
idolatry of mere place of birth seems . . . an instance of rank 
superstition. Place of birth indicates nothing about a person’s willed 
attachment to a country, a polity, a way of life. It only describes an 
accident of fate over which an individual had no control. It is a truly 
‘immutable’ aspect of one’s biography, in today’s world more so even 
than ethnicity or gender. 
All citizens of the United States should have an equal legal right to vie 
for the nation’s highest office, more precisely, any inequalities in that 
right should require a full defense . . . . But Article II imposes a totally 
unjustified inequality. There are many reasons why Henry Kissinger 
should not have become President, but his having been born in 
Germany is certainly not one of them. The natural-born citizen 
requirement embodies the presumption that some citizens of the 
United States are a bit more authentic, a bit more trustworthy, a bit 
more American than other citizens of the United States, namely those 
who are naturalized.73  
Kennedy’s position is probably widely shared,74 but it comes without bona 
fides or meaningful analysis. He states without equivocation that the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause’s restricting the presidency to natives is 
rooted in the view that native born citizens are “a bit more trustworthy.” 
But he supplies no sources establishing that this particular view, or 
anything like it, supplied the motivation for the clause’s inclusion in the 
Constitution (1787). Because the possibility of some other motivation for 
 
73 Kennedy, supra note 19, at 176.  
74 Compare, e.g., ibid. (“One concrete way of measuring the extent to which people 
affiliated with different social groups are full and equal members of this nation is 
to ask whether a person associated with that group could plausibly be elevated to 
the highest office in the land . . . .”), with Ho, supra note 53, at 576 (“One way to assess 
whether an individual is a full and equal member of a community is to ask whether 
the individual is eligible to serve in the highest office in that community.”).  
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the clause’s inclusion is not even admitted, none is discussed. His 
conclusion is not merely that the clause is unjustified, but that it is “totally 
unjustified,” which seems an unusually strong claim (particularly absent 
sources). His position that the test of societal fairness is the openness of the 
government’s highest position to all comers would consign every inherited 
monarchy to obloquy. All things being equal, Post’s position may be the 
better view—maybe monarchy, including constitutional monarchy, is a 
poor way to govern. But that view is not the only view or even the only 
reasonable view. It is just another contestable political position. Many 
constitutional monarchs can be removed and the monarchies themselves 
terminated by a statute passed in the ordinary course of parliamentary 
business using ordinary majority rule. As a result, such monarchies carry 
democratic bona fides, which is some justification for maintaining them in 
spite of the abstract reasoning of academics and other elites who oppose 
that form of government.75 Indeed, given the odd vagaries of the American 
electoral college and its imperviousness to democratic reform by simple 
majoritarian mechanisms, it might be argued that such monarchies carry 
better democratic bona fides than the American presidency.  
Finally, Kennedy tells the reader: “Place of birth indicates nothing 
about a person’s willed attachment to a country, a polity, a way of life.” As a 
pragmatic matter, Kennedy’s claim here is somewhat of an 
oversimplification. The vast majority of American citizens born in the 
United States carry U.S. citizenship and only U.S. citizenship. By contrast, 
naturalized U.S. citizens in the vast majority of cases carry some foreign 
citizenship. When the latter become naturalized United States citizens, 
 
75 See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, AND ON 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN CERTAIN SOCIETIES IN LONDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT: IN A 
LETTER INTENDED TO HAVE BEEN SENT TO A GENTLEMAN IN PARIS (London, England: J. 
Dodsley, 1790) (decrying abstract reasoning as a basis for constitutional 
settlement in favor of models relating to inheritance and long-standing practices 
and traditions).  
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their foreign citizenship is not recognized (for most purposes) under U.S. 
law. Nevertheless, the United States does not compel its naturalized 
citizens to give up their foreign citizenship. And, not surprisingly, very few 
naturalized U.S. citizens make active efforts to do so. In short, as a practical 
matter, “place of birth” does tell us something about one’s “willed 
attachment to a country.” Some people (i.e., the natives) will have a “willed 
attachment” to one country, while others (i.e., naturalized citizens, but also 
some natives) will have a “willed attachment” to two or more countries. 
Similarly, while one might admit that some natural born citizens will spend 
their formative years abroad, many (if not most) of those will do so under 
the tutelage and direction of at least one American parent, and frequently 
they will attend American-affiliated schools or schools offering American 
curricula. By contrast, when foreigners who grow up abroad—i.e., in their 
birth countries—become naturalized U.S. citizens, they will reach their 
new political identity having come with connections to “a [foreign] polity, 
[and] a [foreign] way of life” in a fashion a large majority of native born 
citizens will not have done. These different experiences and associated 
skill sets do not make them less than “trustworthy,” and, in fact, they may 
make them particularly useful, including in times of war and other crises, 
to their fellow American citizens—native and foreign born. But it does, in a 
substantial majority of cases, situate them differently from most native 
born citizens. One might suggest that the latter are more likely to identify 
with a single country: the United States. Admittedly, that’s a contestable 
empirical proposition, but it is not falsified merely by Professor Kennedy’s 
strong language.  
In a second article, offering even stronger objections to the Natural 
Born Citizen Clause, titled What is the Constitution’s Worst Provision, 
Professor Post wrote:  
[The Natural Born Citizen Clause] is remarkably innocent of both 
legislative history and judicial gloss. . . . [T]he Clause is highly 
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objectionable because it unmistakably and clearly prohibits 
naturalized citizens from becoming President.  
Without doubt [in 1833] Joseph Story correctly identified the purpose 
of this prohibition as cutting “off all chances for ambitious foreigners, 
who might otherwise be intriguing for the office.” We might therefore 
understand the Clause as resting on three propositions: It distinguishes 
citizens from foreigners; it reserves the Office of the Presidency for the 
former; and it classifies naturalized citizens with the latter. It is the 
third and last proposition that I find so disturbing.  
Our constitutional order does not ordinarily distribute the 
prerogatives of citizenship on the basis of where or how one is born. 
Allegiance is the sign of membership. Because allegiance is a matter of 
voluntary commitment rather than birth, it should not systematically 
differ as between naturalized and natural born citizens.  
. . . . 
[A]t the very heart of the constitutional order, in the Office of the 
President, the Constitution abandons its brave experiment of forging a 
new society based upon principles of voluntary commitment; it 
instead gropes for security among ties of blood and contingencies of 
birth. . . . It is a vestigal [sic] excrescence on the face of our 
Constitution.76 
Post’s position, like Kennedy’s, is judgmental, rather than dispassionate. 
Phrases like “vestigial excrescence” are not common to U.S. law journals. 
He starts by telling the reader that there is little information on the clause. 
He then turns to Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, a treatise 
from 1833—more than forty years after 1787. Here, Post assures the reader 
that Story’s position “without doubt . . . correctly identified the purpose of 
the clause.” How Post came to this determination is unexplained. His 
complaint against the clause is that it abandoned the “brave experiment of 
forging a new society based upon principles of voluntary commitment” 
and that “allegiance is a matter of voluntary commitment rather than 
birth.” Is that correct? If you are born in the United States, you owe it 
allegiance—that’s fixed in stone by the Fourteenth Amendment. That was 
true for white people before the Fourteenth Amendment77 was ratified, and 
 
76 Post, supra note 19, at 192 (footnotes omitted).  
77 United States Constitution, Amendment 14 (1868).  
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it was true for people of every race afterwards.78 Voluntariness has nothing 
to do with it.79 Noncitizens can be naturalized—but United States 
naturalization authorities will naturalize adults and children. And 
children do not meaningfully volunteer to become citizens. Post’s belief 
that voluntariness is a central organizing principle behind citizenship and 
allegiance is both mysterious and unexplained.  
It is possible that Professor Post’s “voluntariness” language is really 
libertarian code acting as a cover to normatively prescribe an 
individualized assessment of loyalty,80 as opposed to a coarse group 
standard, for qualifications for public office. That might be the right policy, 
but it is equally a reason to open up all positions to actual aliens—those who 
are not now and who do not intend to become naturalized citizens. 
Citizenship-status is just another group qualification or standard acting as 
a proxy for loyalty. If Post’s position is that the naturalization process and 
its tests separate loyal wheat from disloyal chaff, then that too is a 
contestable empirical claim which calls for evidence, as opposed to his 
mere strong language of disgust relating to “vestigial excrescence[s].”  
James C. Ho, then a practitioner, and now a federal appellate judge, 
wrote that he and other naturalized citizens face a “a certain measure of 
exclusion” in consequence of the Natural Born Citizen Clause.81 Still his  
 
78 Of course, there are exceptions, including: “the child of an ambassador or other 
diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of 
the place where the child was born.” United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 
658 (Supreme Court of the United States 1898) (Gray, J.).  
79 See RAWLE, supra note 1, at 80–81 (expressly rejecting the concept that 
citizenship is a voluntary relationship, and asserting, instead, that under United 
States law citizenship follows from place of birth, i.e., birth in the United States). 
80 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 666 (Supreme Court of the United States 
1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Loyalty and the desire to work for the welfare of 
the state, in short, are individual rather than group characteristics. An . . . alien 
may or may not be loyal; he may or may not wish to work for the success and 
welfare of the state or nation. But the same can be said of an eligible alien or a 
natural born citizen.”).  
81 Ho, supra note 53, at 575 and 576.  
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paper has no substantial discussion82 what purpose the clause serves. 
Indeed, he took no position whether the clause is useful; instead, he wrote: 
“Perhaps, this business of distinguishing between natural born citizens and 
merely naturalized (unnatural?) citizens for purposes of [p]residential 
eligibility makes sense; perhaps not.”83 He is strangely agnostic, 
notwithstanding his personal exclusion from eligibility to the presidency. 
Instead, he notes that Congress has imposed by statute the United States 
Constitution’s qualifications for elected presidents on temporary or acting 
presidents,84 and he weakly recommends that those statutory restrictions 
be relaxed. He offers two reasons. First, such a statutory reform would 
allow “members of a previously excluded class of individuals some 
opportunity to prove that loyalty to the United States, the Constitution, and 
our founding principles of freedom and democracy is not the exclu sive 
province of the native-born.”85 Second, such a reform “would bring[] 
millions of American citizens just one step closer to full representation by 
their President.”86 It is puzzling. The reasons Ho puts forward for relaxing 
those statutory restrictions, and for allowing naturalized citizens to serve 
as acting presidents would seem to apply equally to regularly elected 
presidents. But his paper makes no recommendation in regard to amending 
the Constitution in a similar fashion—even as an aspirational goal. If equal 
 
82 See ibid., at 585 (closing publication with the argument that permitting 
naturalized citizens to serve as acting President “is a step that would extend to 
millions of current and future [American?] mothers and fathers the distinctively 
American dream that their children might someday grow up to be (acting) 
President.”). But cf. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the 166th Ohio Regiment, 
Washington, D.C., August 22, 1864, HOUSE DIVIDED: THE CIVIL WAR RESEARCH 
ENGINE AT DICKINSON COLLEGE/150TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION, 
<http://hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu/node/40421> (“I happen temporarily to 
occupy this big White House. I am a living witness that any one of your children 
may look to come here as my father’s child has.”). 
83 Ibid., at 576 (footnotes omitted).  
84 Ibid., at 583; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
85 Ibid., at 585.  
86 Ibid.  
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participation rights are the test of fair governance, and if loyalty-related 
concerns are of no concern, then distinguishing the qualifications for 
elected and temporary presidents becomes difficult to justify.  
(C.) Early Post-Ratification Materials. As opposed to the 
modern post-ratification materials, discussed above, the early post-
ratification materials did not mince words. They are not oblique. They 
express a very definite point of view in regard to the purpose of the  Natural 
Born Citizen Clause: the clause exists to obviate the risk of war.  
In 1826, Chancellor Kent explained that the purpose of the Natural 
Born Citizen Clause was to preclude “ambitious foreigners [from engaging 
in] intrigue for the office, and the qualification of birth cuts off all those 
inducements from abroad to corruption, negotiation, and war.”87  
Writing in 1833, James Bayard Jr. stated:  
Were foreigners eligible to the office [of the presidency], it would be an 
object of ambition, or of policy, with foreign nations, to place a 
dependent in the situation; and scenes of corruption and bloodshed, 
which disgraced the annals of Poland, might have been acted over 
again in this country. The necessity of citizenship by birth, precludes 
this, by rendering it impossible for any foreigner ever to become a 
candidate.”88 
5. The Natural Born Citizen Clause and Three Hypotheticals Relating to 
War and Peace. Consider the following hypotheticals. Imagine a long-
enduing rivalry between two world-wide empires: Empire A and Empire B. 
Each has its capital in Europe. The two empires go to war against one 
another from time to time. There is no long-term optimism for world peace. 
The consequences of such wars are devastating. The United States tries to 
stay neutral, but U.S. merchant ships are attacked. The United States offers 
to mediate.  
 
87 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 255 (New York: O. Halsted, 1826), 
<https://tinyurl.com/8bf5hw2m>.  
88 JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 96 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Hogan & Thomson, 1833), 
<https://tinyurl.com/5yh8db6y>.  
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The President will choose one of two senior State Department 
candidates to act as chief mediator. Both candidates are U.S. citizens; both 
are equally loyal to the United States; and both are equally good choices in 
terms of traditional “merits” or “qualifications.”  
One candidate was born in the United States, and he is able to trace 
his American heritage back six generations through both his father and 
mother. His ancestors served in the active U.S. military during the 
American Civil War and both world wars.  
By contrast, the other candidate was born in Empire A, grew up in 
Empire A until the age of 16, was educated there, which is where his 
extended family remains, and then, at the age of 16, immigrated to the 
United States with his immediate family after they and he had been bombed 
by Empire B’s military (in a prior conflict). The second candidate 
subsequently became a naturalized U.S. citizen, albeit, he has never 
formally given up his Empire-A citizenship. Arguably, he is a dual national. 
Culturally, he retains some “connections” with Empire A.89  
 If you were the President, which candidate would you choose?  
Which candidate is more likely to mediate the dispute successfully?  
If you think it reasonably clear that the second candidate would be 
the lesser choice—despite that candidate’s loyalty, allegiance, and 
trustworthiness, then you are admitting that reasonable judgments relating 
to “merits” and “qualifications” are not entirely co-extensive with 
 
89 Does the extent of the second candidate’s continuing post-naturalization 
cultural contacts with Empire A affect one’s analysis? E.g., The candidate attends 
a church in communion with Empire A’s state church. He speaks Empire A’s 
dominant non-English European language. He has frequently vacationed in 
Empire A since becoming an adult. He is a member of its bar. He has taught in its 
state universities, where his own children have been educated. His family’s burial 
plot is there, and he intends to be buried there himself. His spouse is a Nation-A 
citizen, and the couple was married there, where her immediate family abides. It 
goes without saying that not one of these connections is evidence of any 
“disloyalty” to the United States. But should these connections, nevertheless, 
influence our choice between rival candidates? 
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traditional prudential judgments involving the candidate’s policy 
approach, education, skills, and experience. The candidate’s actual merits 
do not relate in toto either to the individual candidate’s abstract 
qualifications or to intramural (American-focused) distributional 
consequences among competing (American) pools of candidates in 
connection with their group status, ethnicity, national origin, etc. Instead, 
the better choice is connected with the function of the position and the 
candidate’s likelihood of success  in that position. The latter might turn on 
how foreigners react to the American candidate. How the foreigners react 
to the American candidate for chief mediator might be rooted in their own 
reasonable prudential judgments, or it might arise in consequence of 
bigotry, prejudice, and other irrational preconceptions. In any event, the 
foreigners’ reaction(s) might define the possibility for a successful 
mediation, where the stakes are large. The President’s choosing a chief 
mediator based upon what he believes will be Empire B’s reaction might 
work an unfairness vis-à-vis the individual candidate. In some instances, 
that unfairness might be so great that the United States might (and should) 
walk away from the process or simply tell Empire B that the United States 
chooses its functionaries as it sees fit. But the President might not take that 
approach. The President might tell the second candidate.  
You hold and have held high positions of trust in the State, and will hold 
others in the future. The success of this diplomatic mission will raise all 
boats—the prestige of the United States and my administration, the 
condition of the people in the warring states and neutrals, and the safety of 
all our people living abroad, along with the commercial interests of our 
people engaged in foreign trade. It might be unfair to you individually, but 
the stakes are too large for me to allow that admitted, individualized 
unfairness to determine my choice.  
Contra Professor Kennedy and Professor Post, is not the president’s 
approach in this hypothetical a reasonably fair or good one—at least in 
some circumstances?  
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Now take a step back. Assume there is no Natural Born Citizen 
Clause. Here, the hypothetical is not that the President is choosing between 
two candidates for chief mediator. Instead, you, the voter, are choosing 
between two otherwise similarly placed presidential candidates —one 
foreign born (but now a naturalized citizen) and one native born. It is 
understood that the President will personally attend and chair the peace 
conference at the head of the American diplomatic delegation. Would it be 
entirely wrong for a voter to vote for the native-born presidential 
candidate, and against the foreign born one based on their different life 
stories? In such circumstances, the former candidate benefits from the 
fortuity of birth, blood, time, and place. If your answer is yes—that a voter 
could reasonably cast his vote on such a basis, then one might argue that the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause is but one short step removed from that choice. 
The Natural Born Citizen Clause constitutionalizes the choice of the 
hypothetical president (appointing the chief mediator) and the 
hypothetical voter (electing a President), discussed above.  
 Now consider a second hypothetical. Assume, again, there is no 
Natural Born Citizen Clause. Empire A and Empire B are at war. The United 
States is holding a presidential election. The two candidates for President 
of the United States have similar party manifestos, etc. But their vitas are 
those of the two hypothetical chief mediators described above. If you were 
a citizen of Empire B and an advisor to its government, how (if at all) would 
you advise your government to react to this situation? Would you do 
nothing at all? Would your citizens (and posterity) think such conduct 
responsible? What would your citizens think if you chose not to respond or 
interfere in the U.S. election? Is it obvious what counts as lawful speech or 
unlawful interference—under the standards of public international law 
and domestic U.S. law? Would not your advice, given during the exigencies 
of war time, and with less than perfect information, depend on many 
contingencies and imponderables relating to military developments and 
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the likelihood of your successfully affecting the outcome of the U.S. 
election?  
 Now consider a third hypothetical. You are now a delegate to your 
country’s constitutional convention. Your independent country is 
relatively new, not particularly wealthy, and not especially powerful. But 
you know there will be wars, and the great powers have an interest, if not in 
moving your nation onto “their” side, at least in keeping your nation from 
allying with the “other” side. Naturally, you fear such entanglements, and 
you fear interference by these foreign nations in your decision-making. 
You fear such interference because if it is successful, it means you will not 
be the master in your own home. You fear it because the actions of one 
foreign power might lead to counter-efforts by their foreign opponents. 
And you fear it because the result may not just be loss of control in elections, 
but domestic disputes about fair-play during contested elections which 
could lead to civil strife and, perhaps, to civil war amongst rival domestic 
personalities and factions. You have no clear idea how far the great powers 
will go to keep your country from upsetting their plans.  
In these circumstances, one way to think about the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause is that it was an effort by the Constitution’s Framers to 
pacify the United States’ relationship with foreign powers. It was a 
unilateral effort to indicate that the new nation wanted peace with the 
world’s great powers—its cost was that it bound the hands of the public 
when choosing some of their future leaders.90 It was an attempt to take the 
circumstances of all the hypotheticals posed above off the policy-making 
table by assuring foreign powers that the new and relatively weak 
American Republic intended to stay out of Europe’s wars. Thus, it is really 
 
90 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises (2009) 157 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 707, 729 n.88 (“The Natural Born Citizen 
Clause of Article II keeps talented persons from serving as President.”). Levinson 
and Balkin’s critique of the Natural Born Citizen Clause is correct, but their 
critique equally applies to all other qualifications. 
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no surprise that John Jay, who recommended using “natural born citizen” 
language, was the nation’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs , as opposed to a 
cabinet member having purely domestic responsibilities. The Natural Born 
Citizen Clause was never about us (Americans)—native born or foreign 
born; it was always about them (foreign powers).  
Conclusion. 
The efforts of the modern commentators to explain the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause as one rooted in bigotry91 and prejudice directed at 
naturalized citizens is the product of an intellectual milieu of large, 
powerful countries, where there is no memory of bombs falling on the 
nation’s core territory or any existential fear of conquest by foreign 
powers. The concern of these authors is merely the fair, intramural 
distribution of society’s benefits and opportunities, between citizens and 
immigrants, and between native-born and foreign-born citizens. The 
“other,” to the extent he exists at all, is just a person who has not yet become 
or who has not yet been allowed to become an American.  
Modern theories of separation of powers and constitutional design 
have little or nothing to do with the Framers’ and Founders’ world of 
revolutions and imperial wars—where oceans and frontiers pose 
dangers—as you yourself pose dangers to others—where others may burn 
down your capital as you may burn down theirs. The Natural Born Citizen 
Clause was the limited policy response of a People who believed that 
beyond one’s national frontier was a dangerous world. That the clause’s 
 
91 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, “Natural Born Citizen” as Illuminated by the Cruz 
Candidacy (2017) 161(2) PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 111, 
125 (characterizing the original public meaning of Article II’s presidential 
eligibility rules as “offensively discriminatory, nativist, and xenophobic”); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Reflections on the “Natural Born Citizen” Clause as Illuminated 
by the Cruz Candidacy, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW BLOG 
(15 September 2016), <https://tinyurl.com/h5mevuzc> (same). But see ibid. 
(characterizing the United States as “an entire nation of immigrants,” absent 
excepting the indigenous inhabitants).  
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purpose is no longer widely understood indicates that much has changed 
since 1787.  
